Name Notebook XL

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(Continuation from previous notebook)

Quotes from Robert Hunter - "Revolution"
- New York, Harpers, 1940.

p. 327. "Sudden and pronounced changes in the purchasing power of money have been, as we have seen in a previous chapter, one of the most disturbing and destructive factors in social relations. By debauching the currency, one form of cement which had held together the citizens was dissolved after the World War in nearly every nation on the continent of Europe. In the defeated countries, the trade-unions, soviets and councils of armed soldiers and sailors were powerfully organized. The hastily formed governments gave attention only to their demands and other claims and interests had to be sacrificed. As it was desirable that no powerfully organized group should be

offended and as it was practically impossible to borrow money, the easiest and most convenient method of financing the requirements of the State was to print an part as possible promises which would never be paid, in other words to confiscate, secretly and unbeknownst an important part of the wealth of their citizens.

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"By a convenient monetary device the State had before 1923 taken from the middle class about one-half its property in England, seven-eighths in France, eleven-twelfths in Italy, and virtually the whole in Germany, Austria, Hungary and Russia (Keynes). ... In Russia at one stroke rich and poor

ful classes lost their possessions and ~~and~~ the prospect of any influence in the political administration of the country. The communists cherish the thought that only in Russia was the property of the capitalists confiscated. As a matter of fact, in all the defeated countries, the liquid assets - savings, bank deposits, insurance policies and gilt-edge investments - of the most thrifty sections of the population were largely or entirely wiped out. Many of the landowners and gamblers who had managed to profit on ~~minus~~ during the era of inflation were stricken as soon as deflation followed. The most intelligent of high and low degree had been sacrificed en masse, which alone explains much

329 that has occurred in recent years and indicates what is likely to happen again in the decades ahead.

"It was inevitable that appalling disasters should befall European civilization as a result of their irrational monetary policies. They unnerved and devitalized the influential groups which had formerly fought for freedom of enterprise, liberty and democracy. It is a teaching of history often repeated, that when the middle class has been plundered and demoralized, no barriers have been left to check the movements of those aspiring to dictatorship. Beaten, bankrupt, weary and humiliated, the productive classes once the Great War have turned, in one country

after another, with rage and disgust from the demagogic politicians and their black magic of monetary tricks.

'The spirit is cowed by what is unexpected and happens contrary to all calculations', wrote Thucydides during the wars and revolutions which were destroying Greece, and once again in the world's history cowed millions have turned to those whom they believed might bring order — no matter what order — out of dread uncertainty bordering upon chaos.

"With the ruin of the middle class came the ruin of the working class; and support for the new breed of Caesars which then arrived upon the scene came mainly from

the unemployed and from those who had become half-demented by the loss of their property and their battles with hunger. 'In Italy Mussolini found his legions out of v---.' Napoleon, Lenin and Hitler rose to power during periods of anarchy of varying degrees, and all three had seen the currencies of their countries become worthless. ----

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Let us repeat: solutions and revolutions are against things, not for things. ---

346 "The intelligentsia, idealists, social reformers, liberals and industrial executives, who believe the government alone is capable of showering upon them blessings, are shouting, without a dissenting voice, for the

some program. State Planned Economy - Planwirtschaft - under the control of some class, group or 'leader', is the goal toward which all countries are moving. It matters little under what banner they march. Socialism, State Socialism, Capitalism, Communism, Collectivism, Bolshevism, Fascism, Nazism, State Planned Economy, the Economic Dictatorship, Militarism, Managed Money, National Salvation, National Investment, Totalitarianism, Authoritarianism, all lead to the same end - the tyranny of the State. Those who believe that a continuous increase in the power of the State is the only remedy for our problems are making their

movements when they denounce Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini. They are all trembling with varying degrees of speed toward the same goal. ---

pistol -- -- The Catalines. They have relied upon the indigent as a revolutionary force

206 -- "Farthest removed from the merciful assaults of the war Gods have been the feeble, though often imaginary, rebellions led by those who may be classed as Spartacists - Catalines. Their attacks have been ill-advised and mis-timed, while their indigent armed followers have been destitute merely and resolute. Without any carefully planned method of warfare, their end results have

been utterly disastrous; and without the sympathy or support of the populace in general, their attempts at revolution have been easily suppressed. ..... They
-- Abortive revolutions ... taught the Bol-
207 sheviks what not to do. .....
... The Catalines. They have relied upon the indigent as a revolutionary force. Catalina, it will be remembered, undertook to form a party of the proprietors and gathered about him present wanting land, the unemployed, the bankrupts and the large number of impoverished veterans who had returned to Rome penniless from the wars. All the discontented men welcomed into the fold, including criminals, outlaws and slaves. The
208 rage aroused by Sulla's brutal ex-
cesses and spoils had created a

host of rebels who also looked to Catiline, vainly supported by Caesar, for leadership. Heavily in debt, he was desperate when he lost his election to the Senate and, in an attempt to seize the State, died fighting at the head of his bedraggled army. [No civil rebellion has ever been successful. ---

"All of the Catilines have made the same mistake. Thinking that revolutions were the product of depressions and that the forces to be employed were the 'down and out', they organized mass uprisings of the lowest classes, only to find that they could neither direct nor rely upon them. What Marx calls 'the gamin-like rotting mass' or 'the lumpenproletar-

cat' was to form hopeful material out of which to assemble the cohorts of rebellion. --- Revolution from below need not be feared when a majority of the people have become mendicants.

nature of N.Y. moments.

213. --- "In the nineties Engels had come to this conclusion: 'The time for small minorities to place themselves at the head of the ignorant masses and exert to force in order to bring about revolution is gone. A complete change in the organization of society can be brought about only by the conscious cooperation of the masses; they must be alive to the aim in view; they must know what they want. The history of the last fifty years has taught that.' Engels had become a democrat. He had discarded the

weapons of the Catalines - conspiracies, barricades, and insurrections - although ~~although~~ ~~although~~ ~~although~~

Quotes from R.G. Collingwood –
"Metaphysics" – Oxford Univ. Press 1940.

pp 23 et seq.

"Proposition I. Every Statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question. [Includes statements made to oneself, and questions asked of oneself by oneself]

"Definition 1. Let that which is stated (i.e. that which can be true or false) be called a proposition, and let stating it be called propounding it.

"Proposition II. Every question involves a presupposition. ... Obviously a question involves large numbers of them.

"Def. 2. To say that a question 'does not arise' is the ordinary English way of saying that it involves a presupposition which is not in fact being made.

"D of 3. The fact that something causes a certain function to aim I call the 'logical effing' of that thing.

"D of 4. To assume is to suppose by an act of free choice. ---- All assumptions are suppositions, but all suppositions are not assumptions; for some are made altogether unawares, and others, though the persons who make them may be conscious of making them, are made without any consciousness of the possibility, if it is a possibility, that others may have been made instead. --A person who 'makes an assumption' is making a supposition about which he is aware that he might, if he chose,

make out that but another. ... When correctly used, the word 'assumption' is always used with this implication of free choice, as when it is said 'let us assume $x = 10$'. -- -

Proposition 3. Logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend upon the truth of what is supposed, or even on its being thought true, but only on its being supposed. --

"Prop. 4. A presupposition is either relative or absolute. ----

"Def. 5. By a relative presupposition I mean one which stands relatively to one question as its presupposition and relatively to another question as its answer. .... To question a presupposition is to demand that it should be 'verified', that is, to

demand that a question should be asked to which the affirmative answer would be that pre-supposition itself, now in the form of a proposition. --- Hence to speak of verifying a presupposition involves supposing that it is a relative presupposition.

"W of 6. An absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer.

"Thus if you were talking to a pathologist about a certain disease and asked him, 'What is the cause of the event E which you say sometimes happens in this

diana?' he will ~~adyn~~ reply, 'The cause of $E = C$' ..... If you now say 'Why?' he will probably answer, 'Because everything that happens has a cause'. If you are impudent enough to ask 'But how do you know that everything that happens has a cause?' he will probably blow up right in your face, because you have put your finger on one of his absolute presuppositions, and people are apt to be ridiculous in this absolute presupposition [cf. Childe's question, p. 55 q.] ...

"Absolute presuppositions are not verifiable. This does not mean that we should like to verify them but are not able to; it means that the idea of verification does not apply to

them, because, as I have already said, to speak of verifying a proposition involves supposing that it is a relative proposition. If anybody says 'Then they can't be of much use in science', the answer is that their use in science is their logical efficacy, and that the logical efficacy of a proposition does not depend upon its being verifiable, because it does not depend upon it being true: it depends only upon its being supposed (prop 3).

Prop 5. Absolute presuppositions are not propositions. This is because they are never answers to questions (def 6); whereas a proposition (def 1) is that which is stated, and whatever is stated

(prop 1) is stated in answer to a question ---- The distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that distinction being (see def 1.) peculiar to propositions.

"Putting the same point differently: absolute presuppositions are never (see def 1) propounded. --- To be propounded is not the business; this business is to be presupposed. The scientist's business is not to propound them but only to presuppose them. The metaphysician's business, as we shall see, is not to propound them but to propound the proposition that this or that one of them is presupposed.

[The Godhead is the absolute presupposition. God is a relative presupposition derived from the Godhead.]

p. 34. "In low-grade or unscientific thinking we hardly know that we are making any presuppositions at all. Because of this tangled condition, the thoughts which come up out of the bottom of our minds present a deceptive ~~~~ appearance of 'immediacy'. I find myself thinking 'This is a clothes-line', and if I merely reflect on this thought without analyzing it I decide that ~~ what has happened is this: I have been confronted with something which in itself, quite apart from what anybody may think about it, just is a clothes-line, and being a clever fellow I have just 'apprehended' that clothes-line, or 'intuited' it, for what it really is, a clothes line-

And if I never think at all except in this quite casual and unscientific way, I shall always be content to believe this is all that knowledge can ever be: the simple 'intuition' or 'apprehension' of things confronting us which absolutely and in themselves just are what we 'intuit' or 'apprehend' them as being.

"This theory of knowledge is called 'realism'; and 'realism' is based upon the gradest foundation a philosophy can have, namely common stupidity.

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p. 35 "---" In the lowest type of low-grade thinking we are wholly unaware that

p. 36 every thought we find ourselves thinking is the answer to a question. We are wholly unaware that the

question arises from a presupposition. This low-grade thinking, therefore, will never give rise to metaphysics; and this is why 'theories of knowledge' which accept instances of low-grade thought as adequate examples of ~~thought~~ what thought is can never understand why there should be a metaphysics, or what metaphysics is about.

"If man has succeeded in dominating the natural forces within him and around him, and in giving both to himself and to his environment a unique character, the character of being a self-made inhabitant of a world called civilization which he has made for himself to live in, the original

nature both of himself and of his surroundings, serving only as the raw material of his craft; if man has done this, it is because in addition to his low-grade thinking he is capable of high-grade or scientific thinking.

"High-grade thinking means thinking energetically instead of idly; thinking hard instead of allowing your mind to drift.

"The higher types of animal organism are higher because, instead of being content to function placidly at a low level of intensity, they have found out how to store energy against an occasion when it will be needed, and when such occasion arises to meet it by an expenditure

of energy that lifts their mechanical effectiveness high above the average level and overwhelms the obstacles as if by a tidal wave.

"What the higher animals have learned to do with their bodies is what man has learned to do with his mind. To call him the only animal who has learned how to think [illegible] would probably be untrue; it it is certainly true that he is the only animal who has learned this lesson so thoroughly as to transform the whole structure of his life by its means, as the structure of life in the higher animals has been transformed by their learning how to store

p. 37

chemical energy and release it at need. Everything that we call spiritually human is due to man's power of thinking kind.

"Mere increase of effort, intellectual or any other, does little to increase its effectiveness unless the increased effort is well directed. Without such direction the additional effort is always in great part, and sometimes completely, wasted. High-grade thinking, therefore depends on two things: increase of mental effort, and skill in the direction of that effort.

"Increase of mental effort brings about not only a difference of degree in the intensity of thinking but also a difference of kind in its quality.

at the lowest level of intensity, as we have seen, one is conscious only of 'intuiting' or 'apprehending' what presents itself to one's mind. To say that it presents itself to one's mind is only a way of saying that one thinks about it without noticeable effort. When one becomes aware of effort, one becomes aware of a mental hunger that is no longer satisfied by what comes into one's mouth. One wants what is not there and will not come of itself. One aims about hunting for it. This ranging of the mind in search of its prey is called asking questions. To ask questions, knowing that you are asking them,

is the first stage in high-grade.

(38) Thinking: the first thing that distinguishes the human mind from the sea-anemone mind of the 'valiant' theory of knowledge.

"The second stage is not merely to hunt one's prey out to hunt it cunningly. To hunt it at all is to ask questions; to hunt it cunningly is to ask questions with skill, or scientifically.

"Here again there are two stages. The first is disentangling, the second is arranging. When a question first comes into one's mind it is generally (I speak for myself, and perhaps I am not here very different from other people) a confused mass of different questions, all

of which, because all must be answered before I can catch my dinner, and because I am hungry, I ask at once. But they cannot all be answered at once. Before they can be answered they must be distinguished, and the rest of questions resolved into a list of questions where each item is one question and only one. - - - -

37. "After disentangling comes arranging. The reason why questions have to be arranged is because one of them may be contingent upon a certain answer being given to another. The question whether you ever beat your wife does not arise

~~what~~ unless an affirmative answer has been given to the question whether you ever had one. Scientific or 'orderly' thinking, as I pointed out at the beginning of Chapter IV, is orderly in the sense that it deals with things in this logical order, putting what is presupposed before what presupposes it. ----

"This work of disentangling and arranging questions, which in the preceding chapter I have called
40. analysis, may be alternatively described as the work of detecting presuppositions. The question whether a man has left off beating his wife yet presupposed that he has formed the intention of leaving off. That presupposes that he

need to beat him. That presupposes that he has one. All these are relative presuppositions: each of them stands now as the presupposition to a question, now as the answer to one. Each is both a presupposition and a proposition.

"But there are absolute presuppositions. And no man can call a presupposition relative until he has asked whether it is relative or absolute. Not that is, if he is thinking scientifically. The question 'What does this presuppose?' duly presupposes an affirmative answer to the question 'Does it presuppose anything?'; and to

ach that question is to contemplate the possibility of the thing's being an absolute presupposition, and to claim that you would know it for one if it was one. The analysis which detects absolute presuppositions I call metaphysical analysis; but as regards procedure and the qualifications necessary to carry it out there is no difference whatever between metaphysical analysis and analysis pure and simple as I have been hitherto describing it.

"As regards its modus operandi then, all analysis is metaphysical analysis; and, since analysis is what gives its scientific character to science, science and meta-

-physics are rationally united, and stand or fall together. The birth of science, in other words the establishment of orderly thinking, is also the birth of metaphysics. As long as either lives the other lives; if either dies the other must die with it.

"In saying this I am assuming that metaphysics is the science of absolute presuppositions. I am assuming it because it is what I find in Aristotle, who invented metaphysics; or rather, because it is what I find in Aristotle's account of what metaphysics is, when something else which I have shown to be nonsensical

have been removed. ----

"People do not need to analyse their thoughts very deeply in order to find out that there are a good many things they take for granted without asking whether they are true; but this expression generally means not that they have decided on consideration that it
(+2) would be convenient to ask whether these things are true, but that they have asked this in a half-hearted way, and have been satisfied with answers that would not have satisfied a resolute and unprejudiced inquirer. In such cases the analysis has not been pushed home with sufficient firmness to settle the question whether the

things are being taken relatively for granted or absolutely for granted; whether they are suppositions whose verification is being deferred to a more appropriate occasion or procrastinated out of idleness or faintness of heart, or suppositions which in principle neither admit nor require verification.

"It might seem that the question should be an easy one to answer, because presupposing is a thing people do in their minds, and the distinction between presupposing relatively and presupposing absolutely is a distinction between two ways of doing it, so that a man need be only or-

simply intelligent and ordinarily truthful, one might think, to give an accurate answer to the question which of them he is doing.

But things are not quite so simple as that. To begin with, people may have a motive for deceiving themselves and each other. Often certain things which may happen in people's minds are conventionally regarded with disapproval, the lengths to which people in whose minds they actually do happen will go, in order to persuade themselves and others that they do not happen, are most remarkable. In modern Europe absolute presuppositions are unfashionable. The most thing

to do is to deny their existence. Even people who regard this as a silly fashion may very well be so far influenced by it as to weaken at the critical moment when every available ounce of determination is needed in order to decide whether a given presupposition is absolute or relative; and may allow a kind of mass-suggestion to decide them in favour of its being relative.

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"In the second place candour and veracity of themselves, and even combined with intelligence, can do very little towards answering the question, because the question is not one that can be

settled by introspection. Introspection can do no more than bring into the focus of consciousness something of which we are already aware. But in our less scientific moments, when knowledge appears to us in the guise of mere apprehension, intuiting that which simply confronts us, we are not even aware that whatever we state to ourselves or others is stated in answer to a question, still less that every such question rests on presuppositions, and least of all that among these presuppositions, some are absolute presuppositions. In this kind of thinking, absolute presuppositions are certainly at work, but they are doing their work in the darkness.

the light of consciousness never falling on them. It is only by analysis that any one can ever come to know either that he is making any absolute presupposition, & all or what absolute presuppositions he is making.

"Such analysis may in certain cases proceed in the following manner. If the inquirer can find a person to experiment with who is well trained in a certain type of scientific work, intelligent and earnest in his devotion to it, and unaccustomed to metaphysics, let him probe into various presuppositions that his 'subject' has been taught to make in the course of his scientific

education, and invite him to justify
each or alternatively to abandon it.
If the 'inquirer' is skilful and
the 'subject' is the right kind of
man, these invitations will be
contemplated with equanimity,
and even with interest, so long as
relative presuppositions are con-
cerned. But when an absolute
presupposition is touched, the
invitation will be rejected, even
with a certain degree of violence.

"The rejection is a symptom
that the 'subject', cooperating with
the work of analysis, has come to
see that the presupposition he is
being asked to justify is an absol-
ute presupposition; and the violence
with which it is opposed is a

symptom that he feels the importance of his absolute presupposition for the kind of work to which he is devoted. This is what in the preceding chapter I called being 'bullish in one's absolute presuppositions;' and the reader will see that this bullishness is a sign of intellectual health combined with a low degree of analytical skill. A man who is bullish in that way is a man who knows 'instinctively' as they say, that absolute presuppositions do not need justification. In my own experience I have found that when natural scientists express hatred of 'metaphysics' they are

usually opposing this dislike of having their absolute presuppositions touched. I respect it, and admire them for doing it; though I do not expect scientists always give way to it to rise very high in the scientific world.

45. "This is a precarious method, because the qualifications it demands in the 'subject' are so delicate. As soon as the 'subject' understands what is going on he will lose the faithfulness on which his value depends because it is conditioned upon a kind of virginity in the reflective faculties. Perhaps there was a kind of justice in the allegation that Socrates, the great master of this method, 'corrupted the young men', where the word translated 'corrupt' was

the same word which, when used of a girl, meant 'refuse'. The only altogether satisfactory method is for the analyst to experiment on himself; because this is the only case in which familiarity with the experiments will make the subject more valuable, instead of less valuable, to the inquirer. But it demands great resolution, and the temptation to cheat is stronger than one would expect.

"The purpose of the experiments is to find out what absolute presuppositions are as a matter of fact made on a certain occasion or on occasions of a certain kind. The process, simply qua analysis, is identical with the analysis of ordinary science. In either case presuppositions are brought

to light, and about each one the question is raised and settled whether it is relative or absolute. But after this the two processes diverge. In ordinary science the relative presuppositions are put into the bracket, and later on the question is raised when and how they shall be justified. The absolute presuppositions are thrown back. In metaphysics it is the relative presuppositions that are thrown back, and the absolute presuppositions that are put into the bracket; not in order to justify them, because to talk of justifying them is to talk nonsense (Chap IV, prop 5); but in order to have them scientifically described.

46 "Aristotle's identification of metaphysics with theology may serve as a reminder that no human being can

contemplate these two alternative procedures with quite the same feeling. You may call it superstition or what you will, but hard names make no difference to the fact that there is something a little uncanny about absolute presuppositions. They give people more than a touch of the feeling which Rudolf Otto called numinous terror. This mattered less at a period of history when people had their well-established methods (magic, we all know) of dispelling the terror and enabling themselves to face the things that inspired it. Ours is an age when people pride themselves on having abolished magic and pretend that they have

no superstitions. But they have as many as ever. The difference is that they have lost the art, which must always be a magical art, of conjuring them. So it is a special characteristic of modern European civilization that metaphysics is habitually framed upon and the systems of absolute presuppositions devised. This habit is remote. It is an attempt to overcome a superstitious dread by denying that there is any cause for it. If this mission ever achieves its ostensible object, the eradication of metaphysics from the European mind, the eradication of science and civilization will be accomplished at the same time. If a sufficient number of Europeans want to destroy science

and thus accomplish the suicide of civilization, nothing I can do will stop them; but at present, in England, they have not the power to prevent me from warning those who neither share nor support their design.

"To sum up. Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking. Arising out of this, it will consider (for example) whether absolute presuppositions are made singly or in groups, and if the latter, how the groups are organized;

whether different absolute presuppositions are made by different individuals or races or nations or classes; or on occasions when different things are being thought about; or whether the same have been made myopic, allegoric, ab omnibus. and so on. — — — —

p. 48. [footnote.] "I have hinted above (p 45) and said explicitly below (pp 49 ff) that absolute presuppositions change. A friend thinks readers may credit me with the opinion that such changes are merely 'changes of fashion', and asks me to explain what, otherwise, I believe them to be.

"A 'change of fashion' is a superficial change, symptomatic perhaps of deeper and more important changes, but not itself deep or important. A man adopts

it merely because other men do so, or because advertisers, salesmen etc suggest it to him. 'My friend's formula' 'if we like to start new dodges we may' describes very well the somewhat frivolous type of consciousness with which we adopt or originate these superficial changes. But an absolute presupposition is not a 'dodge', and people who 'start' a new one do not start it because the 'like' to start it. People are not ordinarily aware of their absolute presuppositions (p. 43), and are not, therefore, thus aware of changes in them; such a change, therefore, cannot be a matter of choice. Nor is there anything superficial or frivolous about it. It is the most

radical change a man can undergo,
and entails the abandonment of all
his most firmly established habits
and standards for thought and
action. [P minded to follows rigidly the
consequent logic (consequently 'RSVP']

"Why, asks my friend, do such
changes happen? Briefly, because
the absolute presuppositions of any
given society, at any given phase of
its history, form a structure which
is subject to 'strains' (pp. 74, 76)
of greater or less intensity, which are
'taken up' (p 74) in various ways,
but never annihilated. If the strains
are too great, the structure collapses
and is replaced by another, which
will be a modification of the old
with the destructive strain removed.

a modification not consciously devised but created by a process of unconscious thought. - - - - -

p. 73. "The essential thing about historical 'phases' is that each of them gives place to another; not because one is violently destroyed by alien forces impinging ~~on~~ on its fabric from without by war or from within by revolution, but because each of them while it lives is working at turning itself into the next. To trace the process by which one historical phase turns into the next is the business of every historian who concerns himself with that phase. The metaphysician's business, therefore, when he has identified several different constellations

of absolute presuppositions, is not only to study their likenesses and unlikenesses but also to find out on what occasions and by what processes one of them has turned into another. ----

p. 74. "The dynamics of history is not yet completely understood when it is grasped that each phase is converted into the next by a process of change. The relation between phase and process is more intimate than that. One phase changes into another because the first phase was in unstable equilibrium and had in itself the seeds of change, and indeed of that change. Its fabric was not at rest; it was always under strain. If the world of history is a world in which

tout passe, tout lasse, tout casse, the analysis of the internal strains to which a given constellation of historical facts is subjected, and of the means by which it 'takes up' these strains, or prevents them from breaking it in pieces, is not the least part of an historian's work.

74 "Thus if Gibbon seems out of date to a modern student of the Roman Empire it is not because Gibbon knows fewer facts than the modern student knows; it is because Gibbon was not sensitive enough to the internal strains of what he was about. He begins by depicting the Antonine period as a Golden Age, that is, an age containing no internal strains whatever; and from the non-histor-

ind a anti-historical tone of the open-
ing his narrative never quite recovers.
If Hegel's influence on nineteenth-
century historiography was on the whole
an influence for good, it was because
historical study for him was first
and foremost a study of internal
strains, and this is why he opened
the way to such brilliant feats as
that analysis of internal strain in
nineteenth-century economic society
which entitles Karl Marx to the
name of a great historian. If Oswald
Spengler, who was so much talked
about a few years ago, is today deser-
edly forgotten, it is because whenever
he set himself to describe a constel-
lation of historical facts (what he
called a 'culture') he deliberately ruled

all the strains out of it and provided a picture in which every detail fitted into every other as plausibly as the pieces of a jig-saw puzzle lying at rest on a table.

"Where there is no strain there is no history. A civilization does not work out its own details by a kind of static logic in which every detail exemplifies in its own way one and the same formula. It works itself out by a dynamic logic in which different and at first sight incompatible formulae somehow contrive a precarious co-existence; one dominant here, another there; the recessive formula never ceasing to operate, but functioning as a kind of minority

report which, though the superficial
historian may ignore it, serves to a
more acute eye as evidence of tenden-
cies actually existing which may
have been dominant in the past
and may be dominant in the
future. And even an historian
whose eye is not acute enough to
76 detect the reversive element may
have feelings sensitive enough to
sworn the peculiar quality which
its presence imparts to the whole.
The historian in his study can
perhaps afford to neglect these
strains, because he does not really
care about being a good historian; but
the man of action cannot afford to
neglect them. His life may depend on
his ability to see where they are and to

judge their strength. It was not by gunpowder alone that Cortez destroyed Montezuma; it was by using gunpowder to reinforce the strains which already tended to break up Montezuma's power.

"The same characteristic will certainly be found in any constellation of absolute presuppositions; and a metaphysician who comes to his subject from a general grounding in history will know that he must look for it. He will regard the various presuppositions he is studying to be compossible only under pressure, the constellation being subject to certain strains and kept together by dint of a certain compromise a mutual toleration having be-

kind of a motive like that which causes parties to unite in the form of an army. - - - - -

167. "The suspicion that sentiment, not reason, may afford the true motive of the neo-positivists' anti-metaphysics is confirmed by the way in which we find them conceiving the relation between metaphysics and natural science. They seem to think of

168 metaphysics as 'emotions' toward science (the word is 'Emil Ludwig's' [1. Mysticism and Logic, p. 20] borrowed from Mr. Santayana) and to fear that unless metaphysics is destroyed it will destroy natural science. This implies a complete misreading of the present-day situation. Plenty of people have been protesting for a long

time past against the dogma that natural science, and especially natural science as misunderstood by the positivists, is the only valid type of knowledge. But there has never been any ground for interpreting these protests as evidence of a conspiracy on the part of metaphysicians against the freedom and progress of natural science; and the suggestion that such a conspiracy exists can only serve to reinforce suspicions of persecution mania. No one is lying, or has tried within living memory, to ~~tyrannize~~ tyrannize over natural science in the name of metaphysics. From metaphysics properly so called, the

attempt to ascertain the absolute presuppositions of thought, a rational science that does its work conscientiously can have nothing to fear. ---

173. "Metaphysics is concerned with absolute presuppositions. We do not acquire absolute presuppositions by arguing; on the contrary, unless we have them already, arguing is impossible to us. Nor can we change them by arguing; unless they remained constant, all our arguments would fall to pieces. We cannot confirm ourselves in them by 'proving' them; it is proof that depends on them; not they on proof. The only attitude towards them that can enable us to enjoy what they have to give us (and that means science and civilization

the life of rational animals) is an attitude of unquestioning acceptance. We must accept them and hold firmly to them; we must insist on presupposing them in all our thinking without asking why they should be thus accepted.

But not without asking what they are. That is the metaphysician's question, and Alexander does not mean to warn us against metaphysics. If we could hold firmly to the absolute presuppositions of our thought without knowing what they are, so much the better for us; we should be spared a troublesome inquiry. Alexander does not think we should be spared it. What he wishes to

tell us about it that when we do undertake it we must do so in a spirit of natural piety. In our character as grown men, as metaphysicians, we must treat ourselves in our character as children, as non-metaphysicians, with filial regret. We must not now practise it in the hope either of justifying them or of condemning them, the presuppositions which in that earlier stage of our life we were content to accept.

p. 172. "It was Wordsworth who wrote 'The Child is the father of the Man, And I could wish my days to be Bound each to each by natural piety'.

"It was Samuel Alexander, one of the two or three men in our time who have deserved to be called great

philosophers, who took Wordsworth's lines as a kind of motto for his metaphysical work. When Alexander said that natural piety should be the clue to metaphysical thinking he meant to say, as many sound philosophers have said before him, that a metaphysician's business is not to argue but to recognize facts; and he meant to say also that these facts are not recondite or remote, to be recognized only after a long course of special training and specialized research, but simple and familiar, visible to the eyes of a child, and perhaps hidden from clever men because they are too clever. Certainly, he thought, they must remain hidden from those

wise and prudent men who would accept nothing but what was 'proved'; and were revealed to any babe who would accept them as the child Wordsworth accepted the rainbow. - - - - -

196. "The result of thinking systematically according to any given set of presuppositions is the creation of science; and this, like everything else that the human mind creates, grows for itself a body of institutions to keep it alive. In the case of science there are institutions for the pursuit of scientific research and for the education of young people in its methods and its

197 facts. The result of thinking systematically about what presuppositions are actually in use is the creation of metaphysics or theology, and this,

too, has its own institutions, which in modern Europe (where 'theological colleges' are more concerned with vocational training for the clerical profession than with theological or metaphysical instruction and research) have been almost squeezed out of existence between scientific institutions on the one hand and religious institutions on the other, but flourished once in Europe as they still flourish in the East, though even there the influence of European examples threatens them. It is because they hardly exist in Europe that pseudo-metaphysics of various kinds is so rife there. The result of simply presupposing our presuppositions, clinging to them by a sheer act of

faith, whether or not we know what they are, whether or not we work out their consequences, is the creation of a religion; and the institutions of a religion have this as their object, to consolidate in believers and perpetuate in their posterity the absolute presuppositions which lie at the root of their thought.

"It is because absolute presuppositions are not 'derived from experience', but are catalytic agents which the mind must bring out of its own resources to the manipulation of what is called 'experience' and the conversion of it into science and civilization, that there must be institutions for perpetuating them. If they were once lost, they could never be recovered except by repeating the same kind of process by which they

were originally created. As to the
148 nature of this process very little is
known. That is one of the questions
on which light will be thrown by
the reformed metaphysics described
in chapter VII. At present there is
little we can say about it except that
it must have been extremely slow.
Granted the preservation of what may
be called the 'scientific frame of
mind' characteristic of European civil-
ization, the whole of modern European
science could be reinvented in a very
few thousand years, or even in a
matter of hundreds, if all records of
its achievements should be lost.
But if the 'scientific frame of mind'
were lost it would be a question of
perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands

before any tolerable substitute for it could be invented.

"The guardianship of the European 'scientific frame of mind' is vested in the religious institutions of European civilization. In any civilization it is man's religious institutions that refresh in him from time to time the will (for it is a matter of will, though not a matter of choice) to retain the presuppositions by whose aid he makes such sense as he enjoys to such science as he can compass; and it is by dint of these same religious institutions that he transmits these same presuppositions to his children. For if science is 'experience' interpreted in the light of our general convictions as to the nature of the

world, religion is what expresses these convictions in themselves and for their own sake and hands them on from generation to generation. And it does this unquestionably of whether we know by means of metaphysical analysis what these convictions are.

199 "Whenever and wherever men first acquired the habit of dividing the natural world into realms according to resemblances and differences among the things and events which they regarded as composing that world, we may be sure that this new habit of mind had its expression in their religious practices. We may assume with a certain degree of confidence that its effect was to

split them up into a plurality of
different cults practised, perhaps, by
different sections of society, where
each section regarded the others not
as practising a rival religion to their
own but rather as combining with
themselves to maintain a single com-
plex of religious institutions each
one of which was necessary to the
total welfare of society. ... ..

200 . [a specialization of modern science]
... Modern specialization arises and
runs its course within a unity
logically prior to it which it never
attempts to break up. The mutual
independence of departmental specialists
in modern science depends for its
very existence on the presupposition that
one and the same set of laws hold

good throughout the entire world of nature. Unless it were thought an absolute certainty that in this sense nature is one, and therefore that natural science is one also, relations between the various departmental sciences would be as chaotic as the relations between various communities whose frontiers had never been agreed upon, which had never made any treaties, and whose respective positions had never been marked on any map. In the polymorphic science which I am trying to envisage there would be chaotic interrelations of this kind between any one set of inquirers and any other.

225. --- "the Catholic Faith they (the Patristic writers) said is this: that we worship (with the metaphysical rubric) one God in trinity. ..... By believing in the Father they meant (always with reference solely to the procedure of natural science) absolutely presupposing that there is a world of nature which is always and indivisibly one world. By believing in the Son they meant absolutely presupposing that this one natural world is nevertheless a multiplicity of
226 natural realms. By believing in the Holy ghost they meant absolutely presupposing that the world of nature, throughout its entire fabric, is a world not merely of things but of events or movements.

"These presuppositions must be made

they said, by any one who wished to be 'saved'; and, that is to say, from the moral and intellectual bankruptcy, the collapse of reason and civilization, which was overtaking the 'pagan' world. The disease from which that world was suffering they regarded as a fatal disease. A civilization is a way in which people live, and if the way in which people live is an impracticable way there can be no question of saving it. What has to be saved is not the way of living but the people who live in that way; and saving them means inducing them to live in a different way, a way that is not impracticable. The different way of living which these writers proposed for adoption

was the way of living based upon the
absolute presuppositions I have tried, in a
partial and one-sided manner, to
describe. The new way of living
would involve a new science and a
new civilization.

"The presuppositions that go to make
up this 'Catholic Faith', presumed for
many centuries by the religious institutions
of Christendom, have as a matter of
historical fact been the main or funda-
mental presuppositions of natural science
ever since. They have never been the
only absolute presuppositions; there
have always been others, and these
others have to some extent differed at
different times. But from the fifth
century down to the present day all
these differences have played their

changing parts against a background that has remained unchanged; the constellation of absolute presuppositions originally sketched by Aristotle, and developed more accurately, over an eight centuries later, by the Patristic writers under the name of the 'Catholic Faith'. ----

322 ---- "This is what modern physics has done. Developing the Newtonian doctrine in the simplest and most logical way, it has eliminated the notion of cause altogether. In place of that notion, we get a new and highly complex development of the Newtonian 'laws of motion'. Of the two Newtonian classes of events, (a) those that happen according to laws (b) those that happen as the effects of causes,

class (a) has expanded to such an extent as to swallow up (b). At the same time, the survival of the term 'cause' in certain sciences other than physics, such as medicine, is not a symptom of this 'backwardness', because in them the word 'cause' is not used in the same sense. They are practical sciences, and they accordingly use the word in Sense II. — · —

p. 341. 'To quote the latter words of Earl Russell: 'The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.' (op cit p 180) — · — ·

285. .... "One major difficulty, a group of

difficulties, now agonizing students of metaphysics is connected with the idea of causation. ... All I propose to do is to show what I mean by saying that it ought to be discussed historically.

I shall confine myself to making two points.

"1. That the term 'cause', as actually used in modern English and other languages is ambiguous. It has three senses; possibly more, but at any rate three.

"Sense I. Here that which is 'caused' is the free and deliberate act of a conscious and responsible agent, and 'causing' him to do it means affording him a motive for doing it.

"Sense II. Here that which is 'caused' is an event in nature, and its 'cause' is

an event or state of things by producing or preventing which we can produce or prevent that whose cause it is said to be.

"Sense III (Here that which is 'caused' is an event or state of things, and its 'cause' is another event or state of things standing to it in a one-one relation of causal priority: i.e. a relation of such a kind that (a) if the cause happens or exists the effect also must happen or exist, even if no further conditions are fulfilled, (b) the effect cannot happen or exist unless the cause happens or exists, (c) in some sense which remains to be defined, the cause is prior to the effect; for without such priority there would be no telling which is which. If C and

286

-- But whether causal priority is temporal priority, or a special case of temporal priority, or a priority of some other kind is another question.

[Sense I = the historical sense of the word. Sense II is the sense in the practical sciences of nature. Sense III is the sense used in the theoretical sciences of nature)

p. 331. (after pointing out that Kant used the word 'cause' ambiguously) -- "The two propositions which together constitute Kant's definition of the term 'cause' are not compossible: or at any rate not compossible except under a pressure which must produce a somewhat violent strain

332 in the resulting structure. For in

these two statements the word 'cause' is used in two different senses. ------
---- "The logical incompatibility of these two suppositions does not prove that they were not consciously made; it only proves that, if they were consciously made, the structure of the constellation that included them both was subject to severe strain, and that the entire fabric of the science based upon them was in a dangerously unstable condition.

333. ---- During what I will call the Kantian period, roughly speaking from Kant to Einstein, the fabric of natural science, speculative though its progress was, rested on an insecure foundation. Whether the hatred of metaphysics fashionable among natural

mentals in this period was due to a sense of this inequity (discard organisms often lose the remedy / I shall not ask.

[Further interesting pp are 27, 28, 34, ~~51, 52, 55~~, 62, 63, 67, 69, 71, 72, 97, 98, 103, 109, 115-16, 117, 119, 120, 133, 139-40, 162, 163, 170, 183, 184, 193-4, 195, 216, 224, 238, 239, 261, 267, 277, 278, 281, 284, 311, 314, 322, 332, 333, —336, 39-40]

p. 49. "All metaphysical questions are historical questions, and all metaphysical propositions are historical propositions. . Every metaphysical question either is simply the question what absolute presuppositions were made on a certain occasion, or is capable of being resolved into a

number of such questions together with a further question or further questions arising out of these. ----

p. 51. -- "It might seem that there are three schools of thought in physics, Newtonian, Kantian, and Einsteinian, let us call them, which stand committed respectively to the three following metaphysical propositions:

(i) Some events have causes.

(ii) All events have causes.

(iii) No events have causes. [Everything happens of itself]

p. 54. --. "The business of an ordinary scientist relatively to these three sentences is to presuppose in his scientific work:

(AP$_i$) If he is a Newtonian, that some

events have causes;

(AP ii) If he is a Kantian, that all events have causes;

(AP iii) If he is an Einsteinian, that no events have causes.

The business of a metaphysician is to find out:

(M i) That humdrum scientists presuppose that some events have causes;

(M ii) That Kantian scientists presuppose that all events have causes;

(M iii) That Einsteinian scientists presuppose that no events have causes. ---- There are kindred questions. ----

---- "Since the presupposition alleged to be made is an absolute presupposition, and since

the question whether it is made is not a personal one but one concerning the peculiarities of a certain phase of scientific thought, the formula would be more accurately rendered: 'in such and such a phase of scientific thought it is (or was) absolutely presupposed that ....'. This formula I call the 'metaphysical rubric'. -- -

61. "I. Perplexities removed

"(a) As to object. What is metaphysics about? Ever since the time of Aristotle this has been a perplexing question. I have shown that the perplexity goes back to Aristotle himself. Aristotle knew well enough that the science he was creating was a science of absolute presuppositions, and the text of his Metaphysics bears abundant witness to the firmness with which he kept

this in mind and the perspicuity with which he realized its implications; but Aristotle is also responsible for having initiated the human search after a science of pure being, and for the suggestion that a science of pure being and a science of absolute presuppositions were one and the same. This perplexity has never been overcome. ....

If these questions can now be answered. Metaphysics is about a certain class of historical facts, namely absolute presuppositions.

62. ----- "the problems of metaphysics are historical problems; its methods are historical methods.

Chap. XVIII. The Proposition 'God Exists'.

p. 185. "In the last chapter but one I had occasion to comment on the way in which a 'logical positivist', wishing to recommend the doctrine that 'metaphysical propositions' not being verifiable by appeal to observed fact are pseudo-propositions and meaningless, quoted as examples propositions about God, such as the proposition 'God exists'. To him the proposition 'God exists' would seem to mean that there is a being more or less like human beings in respect of his mental powers and dispositions, but having the mental powers of a human being greatly, perhaps infinitely, magnified (cf. supra p. 167)

"In a sense, anyone is free to mean anything he likes by any words whatever; and if the writer whom I quoted

had made it clear that this was only a private meaning of his own, the meaning he personally intends to convey when he says things about God, I should not have interfered. But he proposed to be explaining what other people meant when they say the same things; and these other people, from what he says, I suppose to be Christians. In that case the question what the words mean is not one to be capriciously answered. It is a question of fact.

"What Christians mean when they say that God exists is a complicated question. It is not to be answered except after a somewhat painstaking study of Christian theological literature. I do not pro

186 fess to be an expert in theology; but I have a certain acquaintance with various writers who are thought to have been experts in this time; and I have no fear of being contradicted when I say that the meaning I suppose to be attached by this author to the proposition 'god exists' is a meaning Christian theologians have never attached to it, and does not even remotely resemble the meaning which, with some approach to unanimity, they have expounded at considerable length. Having said that, I am obliged to explain what, according to my recollection of their works, that meaning is.

"But I shall not try to explain the whole of it. For my present purpose

a sample is quite enough. According to these writers (I am speaking of the so-called Patristic literature) the existence of God is a presupposition, and an absolute one, of all the thinking done by Christians; among other kinds of thinking, that belonging to natural science. The connexion between belief in God and the pursuit of natural science happens to be a subject with which they have dealt at some length. I shall confine myself to it.

"For the Patristic writers the proposition 'God exists' is a metaphysical proposition in the sense in which I have defined that phrase. In following them here, I am going counter with my 'logical sentiment',

who evidently does not think it is anything of the kind. In his opinion it has to do not with the presuppositions of science but with the opinions of a quasi-human but superhuman person. And the department of knowledge (or if you like pseudo-knowledge) to which a proposition concerning a matter of that kind would belong is, I suppose, psychical research; or what Swedenborg, brutally cynical as to whether these things are knowable or not, classify as 'occult'. There can be no conceivable reason for classifying it under metaphysics.

187 "If the proposition that God exists is a metaphysical proposition it must be understood as carrying with it the metaphysical rubric; and so under-

stood what it asserts is that as a matter of historical fact a certain absolute presupposition, to be hereafter defined, is or has been made by natural science (the reader will bear in mind my limitation of the field) at a certain phase of its history. It further implies that, owing to the presence of this presupposition, that phase in the history of natural science has or had a unique character of its own, serving to the historical student as evidence that the presupposition is or was made. The question therefore arises: What difference does it make to the conduct of research in natural science whether scientists do or do not

presuppose the existence of God?

"The importance of the metaphysical advice has been well understood by those responsible for establishing and maintaining the traditions of Christendom. The creeds in which Christians have been taught to confess their faith have never been couched in the formula: 'God exists and has the following attributes'; but always in the formula: 'I believe' or originally 'We believe in God'; and have gone on to say what it is
188 that I, or we, believe about him. A statement as to the belief of a certain person or a body of persons is an historical statement; and since Christians are aware that in repeating their creeds they are announcing

theology, one need only accept Aristotle's identification of theology with metaphysics to conclude that the Christian Church has always taught that metaphysics is an irrational science.

"I do not say that it has taught all the implications of this principle. For example, it has not consistently taught that there can be no proof of God's existence. My reasoning on this point is easy to understand. The words are ambiguous. That God exists is not a proposition, it is a presupposition (Chap IV. Prop 5). [from p. 18]. Because it is not a proposition, it is neither true nor false. It can be neither proved

non disproved. But a person accustomed to metaphysical thinking, when confronted with the words 'god exists', will automatically put in the metaphysical rubric and read 'we believe (i.e. presuppose in all our thinking) that god exists.' Here is something which is a proposition. It is either true or false. If true, it can be proved: if false, it can be disproved. Unless it is proved it cannot be known at all; for like all absolute presuppositions a man's belief in God can never be discovered by introspection. If 'god exists' means 'somebody believes that god exists' (which it must mean if it is a metaphysical proposition) it is capable of proof. The proof must of course be an

historical proof, and the evidence on which it is based will be certain ways in which these 'somebody' thinks.

184 "A famous example lies ready to hand. If Gaunilo was right when he argued that Anselm's 'ontological' proof of the existence of God proved the existence of God only to a person who already believed it, and if Anselm told the truth when he replied that he did not care, it follows that Anselm's proof, whatever else may be said either for or against it, was sound on this point, and that Anselm was personally sound on it too. [Footnote: "The name is Kant's. I wanted

seven centuries later than the thing
named, and by a man who did not
understand that thing, it has no
authority. As a description it is not
fabrication. Let us, a those of us who
are not ontological-addicts,
speak in future of 'Anselm's proof'.)
For it follows not only that
Anselm's proof assumed the meta-
physical axiom but that Anselm
personally endorsed the assumption
when it was pointed out to him
whether he had meant to make it'
from the first or no. Whatever
may have been in Anselm's mind
when he wrote the Proslogion, his
exchange of correspondence with
Gaunilo shows beyond a doubt
that on reflection he regarded the

fool who 'hath said in his heart, There is no God' as a fool not because he was blind to the actual existence of <u>an</u> <u>common</u> 'Dieu', but because he did not know that the presupposition 'God exists' was a presupposition he himself made.

'Anselm's proof is strongest at the point where it is commonly thought weakest. People who cannot see that metaphysics is an historical science, and therefore historically check metaphysical propositions of their whole, fancying that Anselm's proof

170 stands or falls by its success as a piece of pseudo-metaphysics, that is, by its success in proving the proposition that God

ejects, as distinct from the proposition that we believe in God, have allowed themselves to become factions in indignant over the fact, as they think it, that this argument starts from 'our idea' of God and seems to proceed thence to 'God's existence'. People who beg this blunder are following Kant, I know. But it is a blunder all the same. When once it is realized that Anselm's proof is a metaphysical argument, and therefore a historical argument, it can no longer be regarded as a weakness that it should take its stand on historical circumstances. What it proves is not that because our idea of God is an idea

of id quo maius cogitari nequit therefore God exists, but that because our idea of God is an idea of id quo maius cogitari nequit we stand committed to belief in God's existence.

"It is because Anselm's proof so explicitly takes its stand on history that it provides so valuable a test for a metaphysical turn of mind. A man who has a bent for metaphysics can hardly help seeing even if he does not wholly understand it, that Anselm's proof is the work of a man who is on the right lines; for a man with a bent for metaphysics does not need to be

told that metaphysics is an historical science, and at his first meeting with Anselm's proof he will realize that it is historical in character. I do not suggest that persons with a bent for metaphysics are the only ones who can do valuable work in metaphysics. Kant is an instance to the contrary. ---

p. 153. (cp. xiv)

"'Metaphysics', said Bradley [Appearance and Reality, preface; Ed. 1930 p. xii] 'is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct'. If I understand this epigram correctly, it is an accurate description of what Hill was doing when he attempted to justify inductively the belief that the course of nature is uniform. What Bradley seems to be saying is this: 'Why we

believe things of that kind I do not
p. 154 know. Let us give this ignorance a
name by saying that we believe them
upon instinct; meaning that, at any
rate, it is not because we see reason
to believe them. Metaphysics is the
attempt to find reasons for these
beliefs. Experience shows that the
reasons then found are always bad
ones'. Bradley is popularly regarded
as an opponent of Mill; but he was
never so much that as a disillusioned
and rather cynical follower. --- Brad-
ley's system represents the state of
mind of one who has begun by
accepting the fundamental principle of
primitive metaphysics, the prin-
ciple that all the presuppositions
we can deduct underlying our thought

must be justified, and justified by an appeal to observed facts; has gone on to recognise that in practice this justification regularly fails; but has not yet taken the step of inferring that the game is not worth the candle, still less of asking whether the game is really metaphysics at all. It is in fact, of course, pseudo-metaphysics.

Chap XVI

Suicide of Positivistic Metaphysics.

"In Chapter XIV I have in effect defined the positivistic mistake about metaphysics as the mistake of thinking that metaphysics is the attempt to justify by appeal to observed facts the absolute presuppositions of our thought. This attempt is bound to fail because

these things, being absolute presuppositions, cannot stand as the answer to questions, and therefore the question whether they are justifiable, which in effect is identical with the question whether they are true, is a question that cannot logically arise. To ask it is the hall-mark of pseudo-metaphysics.

"Bradley's pages show that the greatest English philosopher of the nineteenth century had not yet overcome the tendency to indulge this positivistic error. It is the less surprising that the same error should reappear in a school of thought claiming the name of 'logical positivism'; a school in England at least deriving from Earl Russell, who began his

brilliant philosophical career in close relation to Bradley. The error has taken an exacerbated form, committing public suicide like the legendary scorpion in a ring of fire. It has developed into the following syllogism. 'Any proposition which cannot be verified by appeal to observed facts is a pseudo-proposition. Metaphysical propositions cannot be verified by appeal to observed facts. Therefore metaphysical propositions are pseudo-propositions, and therefore nonsense.' The argument has been set forth with admirable conciseness and lucidity by Mr. A. J. Ayer in his book Language Truth and Logic (1936).

"What is given us as an attack on metaphysics is an attack on pseudo-

cf. Stuart Chase & many others Korzybski 163

metaphysics. The minor premiss of the above syllogism expresses characteristically the characteristic positivist error as to what metaphysics is: the error which converts metaphysical propositions (i.e. propositions about the limits of absolute propositions) into pseudo-metaphysical propositions by omitting the metaphysical subject. As I pointed out in Chapter XIII, this comes from a blunder in logic: the blunder of mistaking suppositions for propositions, and consequently thinking that logical efficacy, or the power of causing questions to arise, belongs exclusively to propositions, or things which are either true or false. Once again, true to the positivistic tradition,

does not possess the idea of supposing, and a priori not the idea of an absolute presupposition. Any statement of an absolute presupposition which he encounters in the course of his reading, therefore, he regards as a statement of a proposition; and for the metaphysical question 'Was this presupposition made on a certain occasion or not?' he substitutes the pseudo-metaphysical question 'Is this proposition true?'

"How deeply Mr. Ayer stands committed to the position that 'metaphysics' means pseudo-metaphysics will appear even from a cursory examination of his text. On the second page of his preface he

guides or examples of metaphysical propositions 'that there is a
164 non-empirical world of values', 'that men have immortal souls', and 'that there is a transcendent God.' (op. cit. p. 12). I do not propose to understand all the words he uses, but I think I understand enough of him to see that he is repeating the familiar Kantian definition of the subject-matter of metaphysics, 'God, freedom, and immortality', with the implication that metaphysicians, when they speak of these things, propose to be asserting the existence of what he calls 'empirical matters of fact'. In his chapter on 'The Elimination of Metaphysics' (ch. i) he gives further examples

'Bradley's system 'the absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress' (op cit. p 21), which he evidently takes to be the statement not of an absolute presupposition made on occasions of a certain kind but of a would-be proposition about an empirical matter of fact which 'is not even in principle verifiable' and therefore 'has no literal significance' (p. 22); the assertion, he does not say made by whom or in what context, 'that the world of space-appearance was altogether unreal' (pp 26-7); the position maintained separately by monists and pluralists, and by realists and idealists, in their 'metaphysical aspect', a qualification which by reducing his statement to a tautology leaves the reader in some doubt as to what position he has

in mind (p.28); and all propositions about 'substance' (p.32). Except in the case quoted from Bradley, he never in this chapter gives a single example of the propositions he is attacking; all we can be sure of is that he is
165 attacking people who think that they are true (or, for that matter, false) whereas in fact, nothing verifiable, they are neither true nor false and are therefore not propositions but pseudo-propositions, as he calls them on p.12 'putative propositions'. ----

226. --- "A civilization is a way in which people live, and if the way in which a people live is an impracticable way there can be no question of saving it. What has to be saved is

not the way of living but the people who live in that way; and saving them means inducing them to live in a different way, a way that is not impracticable. The different way of living which these writers (The Church Fathers) proposed for adoption was the way of living based upon the absolute presuppositions I have tried in a partial 227 and one-sided manner, to describe. The new way of living would involve a new science and a new civilization.

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p. 13. "There is no science except when two conditions are fulfilled. There must be orderly p. 14. systematic thinking, and there must be a definite object matter to think about. In (ontology) the 'science of pure being', however admirably the first condition is fulfilled,

the second cannot be. In the case of every other science, there is a definite subject-matter whose peculiarities differentiate it from the subject-matter of every other science. But the science of pure being would have a subject-matter entirely devoid of peculiarities; a subject-matter, therefore, containing nothing to differentiate it from anything else, or from nothing at all. [This suggests that ontology, ~~metaphysics~~ rather than being a science, is an art. And that since the spirit is within each man, he can experience pure being even if not with his mind alone. RBG.]

"The universal of pure being represents the limiting case of the

abstractive process. Now even if all science is abstractive, it does not follow that science will still be possible when abstraction has been pushed home to the limiting case. Abstraction means taking out. But science investigates not what is taken out but what is left in. To push abstraction to the limiting case is to take out everything; and when everything is taken out there is nothing for science to investigate. You may call this nothing by what name you like - pure being, or God, or anything else - but it remains nothing, and contains no peculiarities for science to examine. [This finds agreement with Hegel's Logic. Also]

"This is why the science of pure being cannot be called a science in the ontological

sense in which an ordinary science is so called.

"An ordinary science is the science of some definite subject-matter, having special problems of its own that arise out of the special peculiarities of the
15. subject-matter, and special methods of its own that arise out of the special problems; whereas the science of pure being has a subject-matter which has no special peculiarities and therefore gives rise to no special problems and no special methods. This is only a roundabout way of saying that there can be no such science. There is not even a quasi-science of pure being; not even a thing which in certain ways resembles an ordinary science and in certain ways differs

from it, such as a collection of statements
that are not certain but only probable,
connected together in ways that are
not convincing but only suggestive.
There is not even a pseudo-science of pure
being; not even a collection of what seem
to be statements but are in fact only a
record of groups, intellectual gropings &
emotional reactions that take place
within us when we confront an object
we do not understand. [Cf. 'Neti, neti',
and Meister Eckhart. NRG) ----

p. 52. "The axioms numbered (i), (ii),
(iii), above, express absolute presupposi-
tions made respectively in three differ-
ent schools of physical science. Each
is important, and fundamentally
important, to the science that makes it
because it determines the entire structure

of that science by determining the questions that arise in it, and therefore determining the possible answers. Thus every detail in these separate sciences depends on what absolute presuppositions they separately make. But this does not mean that it depends on these presuppositions' being thought true, or that the truth of the conclusions arrived at depends on the presuppositions' being in fact true. For the logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend on its being true, ~~but only on its being supposed~~ nor even upon its being thought true, but only upon its being supposed. (see Chap IV, pap 3)

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op 53-54. --- "To inquire into the truth of a presupposition is to assume that it is not an absolute presupposition but a relative presupposition. Such phrases as 'inquiry into the truth of an absolute presupposition' is nonsense."

From E. F. M. Durbin "Politics of Democratic Socialism" Routledge, London, 1940.

p. 65. "Of course force will not cure the impulses of aggression. Some psychologists, impressed by this fact and also by the consideration that government is a symbol to most people of their own projected conscience, have concluded that the organization of force is not favourable to peace. We should agree that force is not a therapeutic agent. A policeman will not cure a murderer of

the desire to kill. Our international air forces will not see Hitler a remodeling of the desire to kill. But that, I feel, is not the point. The immediate problem is not to see the aggressor, but to prevent the aggression, or to see that, if the aggression takes place, it can lead to no actions - the indication of the law. That is the valid point. The problem is to see that the great majority of human beings who are peaceful, and the great part of human activity that is constructive, should be protected from the savage and destructive violence of the aggressive minorities. It is only if the powers of peace and social reconstruction will use force to protect themselves that peace within and without the

nation can be prevented.

?? !!

"~~To accept~~ ..." This brings me to the record of my relevant suggestions. The psychological and anthropological evidence suggests very strongly that one of the most important institutions determining the behaviour of any social group is to be found in the type of emotional education characteristic of the group. The character of this institution determines the amount of aggression generated within the group.

"Transformed aggression is due, in my view, to the repression both by the self and by parental authority of simple aggression. Simple aggression, in its turn, I have argued, is due to the frustration of impulse. It would

seem upon this analysis that adult aggressiveness could be diminished either by a reduction in the extent to which impulses is frustrated or by a diminution in the extent to which primary aggression is punished. If children could be frustrated less frequently by being given more open access to the means of their satisfaction, or if they were punished less severely when they exhibited frustration; if, in short, they were allowed to express desire and anger more freely, it should follow, contrary to common speculation, that they would make more happy, more peaceful, and more social adults. The evidence shows overwhelmingly, as we have already seen, that the op-

K

of crimes children

pression of simple aggression does not kill it. It drives it underground and makes it far more horrible and destructive. It is only in the suppression of it that it becomes diminished. It is only within the circumstances of freedom that social habits and a spontaneous desire to coöperate can flourish and abound. 'Spare the rod and spoil the child' — a quiet and convenient member of the familial group. Spare the rod and make a free, independent, friendly, and generous adult human being. — — — —

p. 78. ——— "the capitalist system consists in an economic order possessing three typical characteristics or common forms of behaviour:

a rational technique of production in

industry, trade and finance;
unlimited acquisitiveness as a motive
in individual life;
a steady and rapid expansion of out-
put.

"A national technique in an econ-
omy stands in contrast to the habits
and institutions of traditionalism.

"The typical condition of technical
processes in a pre-capitalist economy is
that of traditional tradition. ---

79. "What is new in the Industrial Revolu-
tion, at the time when the capitalist
order is brought into existence is
not the discovery of mechanical prin-
ciples and mechanical devices. On the
contrary, the knowledge of many of
them existed long before any Indus-

trial Revolution occurred. ---- The new principle is the idea that powers of reason, science and mechanics should be applied to the techniques of industrial production; that machines could and should be used to raise output. A mediaeval society looks upon machines as toys. A capitalist society looks upon them as instruments of production. What has changed is not knowledge, but a habit of thought. What has really altered is an emotional judgment. [money ans ? resp]

money

"Unlimited acquisitiveness" is another, and equally important, aspect of the same fundamental break with traditionalism. The conception of a proper ideal of personal life, which is typical of a mediaeval society,

is that of a station or caste. A man or woman is born into a certain place or order in society, with traditional duties, traditional privileges, traditional functions and traditional stages of personal development. Spiritual guidance as to these duties is provided by the Church. ghostly comfort, and the certain assurance of eternal compensation for the transient sufferings of time, is available for everyone in the orthodox conviction of personal immortality. It would of course be ridiculous to suppose that men and women were ever in any society, devoid of ambition and the impulses of acquisitiveness, but there is, nevertheless,

less, a real sense in which contentment was and is easier to find in a pre-capitalist society. Ambition is more limited; the sense of personal achievement satisfied by status and the knowledge of traditional forms faithfully observed.

"In marked opposition to this stand the accepted and respectable acquisitive ideals of capitalism, based upon the judgment that men should go as far in terms of wealth and prestige as their abilities will permit them to do. This change of outlook about the true purpose of individual life is one of the most difficult to establish in an emergent capitalist system. It is the basis of all the complaints about the

'stupidity', the 'irrationality', the 'untrustworthiness' of the peasantry made by the new and revolutionary class of industrial technicians, whether in eighteenth century England or twentieth-century Russia. It is a process of education and adaptation that has been studied in detail by economic historians under the general title of 'the adaptation of labour to the needs of the capitalist system'. It is a psychological and spiritual change that is of vital importance to the growing system. It is the basis of industrial discipline, factory techniques, and the specialization of function. Without it new mills will not work hard enough, nor long enough;

sometimes they will not work for ways at all. It is equally necessary for the development of the millinery & cars, without which industrial expansion is impossible. It is the total counterpart in national life of rational views in the intellectual life of mankind.

~~F.A.~~ A.N. Whitehead - "Nature and Life" - "The only intelligible doctrine of causation is founded on the doctrine of immanence."

The words of the Roman Catholic office "Deus, qui humanae substantiae dignitatem mirabiliter condidisti, et mirabilius reformasti, da nobis deinde nostrae fieri dignitatis est particeps" — (O God, Thou who didst miraculously create

the dignity of human nature, who held himself worthy to partake of our humanity.) Comment by C.J. Jung in his "The Integration of the personality" pp 236-237 — "What respect for the will of human nature! Ecce et homo! There is here no reminder of that worldliness in the disparagement Pilate-nature has often taken pleasure, and to which it returns all too gladly and easily. ... If God is desirous to partake of human nature, then man also might think himself worthy of partaking in divine nature."

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PROFESSIONAL Aug. 1940

Quotes from "The Way, the Truth & the Life" by J. Alexander Findlay, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1940

p. 14 - "Joined to the Lord, the believer is also possessed. His spiritual nature becomes the medium by which such union with the Lord becomes possible, as the animal nature ('the flesh') is the medium by which union with a harlot becomes possible. The function of the spirit of man, then, is simply one of response; after the surrender has taken place, there is no function of self-direction any longer. To all intents and purposes, the spirit of God has become the centre of personal life. The believer is 'in Christ', possessed by Christ, just the demoniac in Mark's Gospel was described as being 'in an unclean spirit'.

p.71. "The phrase 'in Christ' occurs in Paul's [illegible] twenty-nine times in all."

p.62. .. "It is strange that so vivacious and energetic a man as Paul should have used the passive voice so much more than other New Testament writers. ... Surely the true explanation of this unexplored problem is to be found in Paul's experience of conversion. He had not set out to follow Jesus; he had been "apprehended by Christ Jesus" (Phil iii, 12), stopped in full career and overwhelmed, captured. He was 'the destiny-guilt', whose truth had been evident, originally (1 Cor XII, 8) the decision of his own had nothing directly to do with his having a Christian. 'Had captured' by Christ (2 Cor. ii. 14), all his resistance had been beaten down (Acts XXVI. 14). So he will not speak of knowing God, but of being known by Him (Gal IV. 9; 1 Cor VIII. 3), not of

loving Christ out of being loved by Him (2 Cor v. 14). & The 'love of Christ' (not our love for Him, but His for us) 'has us in its grip', he says. Even our faith by which Paul was saved to the love, is God's gift (Eph ii, 8). "---
[Also perhaps because Paul had more nearly abandoned his ego. dtrg] ---

p. 82. "What is true of his [Paul's] doctrine (if doctrine it can be called) of union with Christ, is also true of his whole theology. The only thing we have to do in response to the grace of God in Christ is to believe, and faith to Paul is surrender. Faith lays the hand upon God, and God does the rest. It is significant that the words 'repent', 'repentance', are conspicuously absent from Paul's vocabulary; this fact also

sin in the sharpest contrast to the general trend of early Christian ~~teaching~~ preaching, as our previous studies have sufficiently shown. The statistics are startling. 'Repent' occurs only once in his Epistles, and then in a quite colourless sense (2 Cor. xii, 21); 'repentance' three times (once in the 'Pastoral' Epistles). The examples are Rom. ii. 4 (here quite general) and 2 Cor vii. 9, 10, where the question concerns the Corinthians' remorse for their behaviour to Paul! This significant absence of one of the watchwords of evangelical preaching may be partly due to Paul's reaction from Rabbinical teaching — the Rabbis taught not salvation by works, but by repentance — but is none the less strange in a man of Paul's strong Puritan leanings. [But may it

not also be done, if repent = metanoia, to
the kind of conversion Paul had? (His mind
was changed for him. ~~Abbott~~ Cf above
quote from p. 62. Abbott). The word
generally translated 'be converted' in
our versions, is only found once in
Paul's Epistles (1 Thess. i, 9), and,
p. 83 like 'repent', lies outside the main
current of his thinking. It would be
unwise to lay too much emphasis upon
Paul's silences, but it is at least
suggestive that he did without the
word 'conversion', as Jesus did
without the word 'spiritual'. The
reason for the rarity of such common
Christian words and ideas in Paul is
clearly that his whole emphasis
lay upon the work of God in the
soul. Men does not 'turn round'

and go in another direction when he answers God's call; he is transformed, governed, lifted up. ... God foreordains, God calls, God sets men free, God transfigures (Rom VIII. 30); men simply consents and God does the rest." ---

p. 141. (Re Q) "We must not judge, for that is to put ourselves in God's place; we are the objects, not the dispensers, of justice. At this point we come upon the word 'hypocrite' for the first time in Q; as it is common to the First and Third Gospels (Luke VI. 42 = Matt VII. 3), we may be reasonably certain that it was found at this point in Q. By the 'hypocrite' of the gospels is not meant a man who was consciously playing a part, for the Jews had no native drama; Semitic scholars agree that the word 'religious' most nearly expresses the idea which the Aramaic word under-

by the Greek 'hypocrite' conveyed. This of course, makes its application to the Pharisees all the more paradoxical.

142. One would have thought that, whatever their failings may have been, they could not be fairly charged with irreligion; they were in a sense the most religious people in Palestine, perhaps in the world. But this was precisely the charge that Jesus brought against them. They were irreligious because they set themselves in the judgment seat, usurping to themselves the functions of God. Of course, they charged Jesus with doing the same thing; and, from their point of view, with some reason (John V. 18).

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147. Jesus would not have expended so much indignation on the Pharisees -

there were not many of them after all - if they had not been so influential that they could and did prevent those who looked up to them and called them 'Rabbi' from entering into the kingdom, the doors of which cut for them would have been wide open. But of the Pharisees we may say as Jesus said of the sinful woman: 'He that is without sin, let him first cast a stone'. It is humbling to realize that the only people Jesus denounced were those who, like me, spent the greater part of their time in teaching religion. All the charges Jesus brings against the Pharisees could justly be levelled at any ecclesiastical bureaucracy. It is well to take heed; that is why there is so much about these men in the Gospels.

"When Luke adds 'which is hypocrisy' & 'Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees', he is

like explaining; in this case, I think, rightly, if it is understood that 'hypocrisy' means not conscious pretence, but an unreality of which those who are involved in it may be themselves unconscious, or only partly conscious. The disciples are to beware of any shunning over of uncomfortable reality; what men do not know, God knows, and what God knows, men will soon find out. Every religious organization with a face to save, like any political party, tends to encourage in its officials the practice of lobbying, of whispering in corners; there are inside influences, and we soon learn to be discreet. So around our conferences and assemblies there has come to hover a heavy atmosphere of intrigue. This would be bad enough in politics; in the

Church of Christ it is an intolerable offence, for in the devotions with which we open our meetings we invoke [illegible] of Hezekiah, in whose presence nothing that cannot [illegible] the light can live."

p. 151 (note). [The "hating" one's parents.]
"The word 'hate' means 'love less' (cf. 'Jacob I have loved, and Esau hated' 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy.")

p. 152 "It has not been generally noticed that it is to M also that we owe our conception of the teaching of Jesus about the attitude of the life of secret devotion. With the exception of the Lord's prayer, the whole section of dealing with religion in secret comes from this source, and Matt. VI. 6 is actually the only passage in the Gospels which gives any instruction for private prayer at all. When we compare

the Gospels with other books of Christian devotion the contrast is startling. Clearly Jesus did not think a course of training in the discipline of the life of inward devotion necessary; all that was needed was to 'enter into the inner chamber and shut the door', for the 'Father' dwells in the 'secret place', and 'knows what we need before we begin to ask'. No elaborate preparations are necessary for approach into the presence, all that is needed is concentration, that we should be single-minded — for only the single-hearted see God — and only think of our fellow-men to forgive them and wish them well, for only 'peace-makers' can be called 'Sons of God'. There is a serene simplicity about all this which

carries with it the very essence of Christian
worship." ----

(Re parable of ten virgins) "As the Messiah
p-185. is never called the bridegroom, so far as I
am aware, in Rabbinical or Rabbinic literature, I think it is probably a mistake to
suppose that in this parable the
bridegroom 'represents' Jesus and His
action any [his] attempt to claim [his]
bride the church. ... In prophetic
symbolism God, not the Messiah, is the
husband of His people. It is possible
that the Fourth Evangelist is responsible
for the eschatological setting of the
parable; certainly 'Be watchful then,
because you know not the day nor the
hour' (Matt xxv. 13) - this is not part
of the parable, but almost certainly the
Evangelist's comment - does not fit the

parable, for even the wise virgins did not keep awake till the bridegroom came. What the parable does bring out unforgettably is the fact that there are some vital things which we cannot share with others, and which cannot be borrowed when wanted; the stores are simply not open when the oil which nourishes the inward flame of devotion can be bought. 184 -- But when God is the bridegroom, many can share in the joy of his appearing; each worshipper has his own lamp, all none more than the others. Yet only those who in dark months and years of waiting have kept the inner flame alive can share the rapture when at last it comes. All the brides -

maids were asleep, and if you had seen them sleeping then, you would not have known who were wise and who were foolish. All the same there was a difference, a difference which made all the difference when the hour came. For this lifelong preparation for a final encounter of the soul with God, for this entry into the common life of man to prepare us. For M, He is the Kingdom of Heaven;..... When we come upon Him, we find the hidden treasure which it is worth a man's while to give up all else to have for his very own. This is 'the holy thing' which must be kept sacred from over-familiar handling."

Re repentance.

In the Acts, --. "6. There is salvation in

this reason alone, but for this repent-
ance is necessary. This emphasis upon
repentance is foreign to the Paul of the
Epistles; then it is almost confined to
the Second Corinthians, and refers to
the sorrow which members of the
Church came to feel because of their
treatment of Paul; there are also one
or two incidental uses of the words
'repent', 'repentance', in Romans and the
Pastorals. But no one could call
the necessity for repentance central
to Paul's doctrine of salvation as
expounded in his Epistles. In the
speeches in Acts, on the other hand, it
is central; Acts ii. 38, iii. 19, viii. 22,
xvii. 30 (Paul's speech in Athens), xxvi. 20
(Paul again). It is, of course, funda-
mental in 2 Cor. liii - the fruit of the

'Servant' is to lead the nations to repent. =

p. 29. "Lest we should fail to see the wood for the trees, it will be useful at this point to refresh our memory of the leading dear characteristics of these books in the New Testament, and then see at what points Luke has carried them further. They are:

"3. He came to call men to repentance, and when calling them only suffered in the case of the few who were conscious of their very sinfulness, He gave Himself up to death on the Cross to win those whom nothing else would move." ----

[In Mark]

p 40. "His first message is: 'The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God

is here; repent, and believe in the good news.' As the word 'repent' never comes again on the lips of Jesus in this Gospel, we may be permitted to wonder whether it has not slipped in here from Matthew [it is omitted by some old Latin and Syriac versions]; it forms part of the preaching of the Twelve on their mission tour (Mark vi. 12); no doubt they would preach repentance, for they had heard so much about it from John the Baptist. If Jesus did use the word, it may, we may conjecture, only to mention connection with the preaching of John; it is not thought of as characteristic of his message. The 'gospel' from the first did not command good

advice, but of good news, of the proclamation of the fact that a saving presence had come to stay among men, that is Him God was actively at work."

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cmp 220, 315-16, 227-9

From "A Study of History" by A. Toynbee, Vol IV. p. 644 et seq., part of a note on the military virtues.

644. [Re von Moltke's glorification of war] "---" This so-called 'heroic' attitude to life is being welcomed with open arms, and taken in deadly earnest, at this moment by millions of young men, and the reason why it appeals to them is manifest. They are greedy for the virtues in the form of the 'military virtues' because

they have been starved of other kinds of spiritual ~~food~~ bread, like the Prodigal Son who, when starved of human food, 'would fain have filled his belly with
676 the husks that the swine did eat.'
Moreover, we know what these prodigals' spiritual substance used to be, and when their starvation began. These latter-day Western worshippers of 'the military virtues' are the grandsons of generations which were nourished on 'the Christian virtues'; and they began to be starved of the traditional Christian morality, upon which their forbears had been brought up, when, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the unbelief of a cultivated minority in the Western World began to affect the less sophisticated masses.

"The truth is that the spirit of man abhors a spiritual vacuum; and, if a human being, or a human society, has the tragic misfortune to lose a sublime inspiration by which it has once been possessed, then, soon or later, it will seize upon any other spiritual food that it can find — however coarse and unsatisfying this new fodder may be — rather than remain without any spiritual nutriment at all. In the light of this truth the recent spiritual history of our Western Society can be told — and the glorification of War can be explained — as follows: Owing to the breakdown of the Hildebrandine Papacy, which was the master-institution of our mediaeval Western Christendom, our Western Public

Christians received such a grievous moral shock that the Christian way of life, in which our forbears had been brought up, very largely lost its hold upon us; and finding ourselves, at the end of a series of calamities and disillusionments, with our home swept and garnished by an intellectual Enlightenment, but untenanted by the Christian spirit that had formerly dwelt in it, we cast about for other tenants to fill an agonizing spiritual void. In this search we addressed ourselves to the alternatives that lay nearest to our hand. Our Western culture had three sources — namely, the internal proletariat and the external proletariat and the dominant minority of the Hellenic

Society to which our Western Society was
'affiliated' — and when Christianity,
which was the religious legacy of the
Hellenic internal proletariat, appeared to
fail us we turned hungrily to the
religions of the Hellenic external
proletariat and the Hellenic dom-
inant minority. As it happened,
these two religions were virtually
the same; they were, both of them,
variants of the two primitive idol-
atrous worships of the tribe or
646 state; and therefore the modern Western
apostate from Christianity, in his
search after a new god, found the
same idol awaiting his adoration in
whichever of the two alternative direc-
tions he cast his eye. Machiavelli
consulting his Livy and Rousseau his

Plutarch and De Golinean to Shulze-
on and Hitler his Wagner were ad-
ded, by his repetitive literary or musical
cracks, to the other steps of the same
Abomination of Desolation; the Totali-
tarian Parochial State. In the
pagan worship of the parochial
community - be it Hellenic or
Gothic or Scandinavian in its inspira-
tion - the cult of 'the military vir-
tues' is an obligatory practice, and
the glorification of War a funda-
mental article of Faith. And we
can now understand why von Holt-
ke declaims, with a passion which
is assuredly sincere, that 'Perpet-
ual Peace is not even a beautiful
dream', and why he deprecates the
abolition of War as a fear, which

is manifestly genuine, but the religion of the 'pacifists' dream may simply plunge our neo-pagan world back again into a spiritual vacuum.

In fact we may be driven to admit that von Moltke is right in taking this stand if he is right in his underlying assumption that modern Western Man is confined to a choice between two, and only two, alternatives. If we have really lost the power & the will to practise the virtues of Gethsemane, then it is certainly better to practise those of Sparta or Valhalla than to practise none at all. And in a ci-devant Christian society this conclusion is no longer academic; for in turning our conditional clause into the simple

indications, von Moltke is now being followed by the masses; and his disciples in our generation can claim, without fear of contradiction, that they have the big battalions on their side. The latter day Western cult of 'the military virtues' as the I am Commandments of a Totalitarian Parochial State is fast becoming the religion of the age; and the foolish, archaistically barbaric though it be, will never be overcome by the ~~Mephisto~~ Mephistophelian spirit of sheer negation against which it is itself a motorious protest. Societies are apt to get the religions as well as the governments which they deserve; and if we have before unworthily

of our Christian birthright, than we have condemned ourselves to worship the resuscitated ghost of an Odin or an Ares. This barbaric faith is better than none at all; in the deaths of a Leonidas and an Olaf Tryggvason the heroism which 'Militarism' inculcates has risen to
6+7 height of sublimity; but this is not the sublimity of the saints, and not a heroism which leads anywhere except to suicide. Witness the fate of the aboriginal Scandinavian civilization and the ancient Spartan civilization, which we have emerged elsewhere. And such likewise will be the fate of our Western civilization if von Moltke is right in his underlying assumption of fact, as

well as in his moral deduction from it. It remains to be seen whether this assumption is correct, or whether on the other hand Christianity, so far from being out of the running, has still the power to release the soul of Homo Occidentalis from the grip of a hideous and destructive paganism by offering him, once more, a higher positive alternative. ... This is the greatest of all the questions that have to be answered in our Western World in this twentieth century."

Quote from "The Tradition of Silence in Myth and Legend" by A.H. Gilliard - S' Estrange - Kegan Paul, London - p 174

p. 4. "The nature of the human heart and mind is so complicated that theoretic teaching takes root only with difficulty. A parable, on the other hand, is like unto an experience for the soul, and only that which is experienced is of lasting worth. Hence, all the truly great ones have taught in parables. Far from the myths and legends being inferior in comparison with historical records, they stand above the latter. A myth or parable certainly needs theoretical explanation, and this is more especially so at the present time, but this explanation is not the principal thing, for its relation to the myth may be likened to the musical accompaniment of a song. To change the metaphor, the explanation may be said to fit

the idea momentarily, just as does a painting, which can only capture and transmit one moment of an event, and which must leave to the imagination what went before and what follows after. A painting is without living action. For a moment that which the artist has depicted - for
p.5. example, a waterfall - may deceive, but the next instant will show that nothing flows. And the flowing is what matters, for in the flowing is life. In like manner the myths and legends show the working of forces in a living stream.

Only those legends and myths come here under consideration which contain an eternal truth. I say 'eternal' in order to avoid the word 'living',

since that which, in the spiritual sense, is dead, is regarded here on earth as being living. (Thus possibly a drama which depicts the trend of an epoch has at times been said to illustrate 'eternal truths'. This I refute. Such a drama differs from myth or legend in that the action represents a transient aspect of earthly life, and its value lies in what is said rather than in the action, whereas in the myth or legend, action is the essential thing.

" The main theme of the great myths is the doctrine of spiritual rebirth, but I cannot emphatically enough that this has nothing to do with the ecclesiastical dogma of salvation

notes from "The Way, the Truth and the Life" by J. Alexander Findlay, Hodder + Stoughton, London 1930

p. 30. "Just because Jesus has a mission to accomplish in a given time (Luke 11 51, 32 f.; cf. XII. 49), and cannot attend upon on Himself, those who follow Him must come all; they must not allow themselves to become entangled in worldly disputes, must cut their losses, at all costs get free (XII. 57 f). Neither 31 friends nor enemies are to detain them; they must not stop to say 'good-bye' to their dearest and best; they must not wait to pay their last respects to parents; must not even look back (XII. 58 ff, XVII. 32); they are not to go home to get an overcoat or purse for the journey (XVII. 31). The danger is lest they

should come too late and find the door of opportunity closed against them, while a hand waves them away from the windows (XIII. 22 f), for a man must love father and mother, wife and child - yes, and himself, too - less than Jesus, if he is to be a 'disciple' in days when God Himself is setting the pace. To all who come within sight or sound of Jesus of Nazareth, His message is: 'Except ye repent, ye shall likewise perish'. (XIII. 3, 5).

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p. 34 "The baptism of the Apostles' preaching — this is as true of Paul as Peter in the Acts — is 'repentance', which means a change of direction rather than 'remorse' for Luke (iii. 38, iii. 19, v. 32, viii. 22, xvii. 30, xx. 21, xxvi. 20), 'turning from sin to a new way of life'. (Luke xxiv. 32; Acts iii. 19, 20)

36. -- "Not until he had repented sufficiently, until he had 'turned again' (Luke xxii. 32) could Peter find solid ground beneath his feet. The proof that his training was complete was the fact that he was, for the first time, ordered to be passive, willing to wait in Jerusalem, until he was 'endued with power from on high' (Luke xxiv. 49). Perhaps the most significant thing about Peter at this stage is that, though the Lord 'appeared to Simon' (Luke xxiv. 34), we have, for the first time in the Gospels, no direct record of anything that Peter said or did on this occasion: he was simply 'born again' - by no act of his own - 'to a new and living hope' (1 Pet. i. 3). When he had learned how to be still and to 'receive the

kingdom of God like a little child' (Luke xviii. 17; cf. 1 Pet ii. 2) he was ready for Pentecost, when the Spirit which had come down upon this 'tender' in 'bodily form' (Luke ~~xviii.~~ iii. 22) came down upon him and his companions, and God Himself spoke through their lips, as He had spoken through the lips of Jesus.

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112. "Neither 'Christianity' nor 'Christian principles', neither the doctrine of the fatherhood of God nor that of the brotherhood of man is ever mentioned in the New Testament. It is true that in the early days the new life was spoken of as a 'way' — that is, a law of conduct — but even then a set of rules or principles was not meant by the expression but the following of a Leader. As com-

(Rosy: The spirit within)

pared with all other religions, Christianity is unique in that it is not founded on a set of ideas about God or even about Christ, but upon the impartation of a power, of life and energy; it does not 'teach' this or that. In the attempt to explain the fact of that impartation, theories without number have been propounded, and, of course, it is impossible for a reasonable being to avoid seeking to understand the rationale of it. All the same, in all true Christianity something is not so much learnt or understood, as given and received.

113

It may, of course, be objected that 'faith' - that is, some measure of belief - is necessary before what is given can be received, but by 'faith' in the new

Testament is meant certainly, not all of it ideas, but a response to the impression produced by a Person. To this response recognition of His divinity is not necessary; if it were, none of our Lord's patients in the Gospels could have received what He had to give them. What does seem to have been necessary was that they should be sensitive and open-minded enough to recognise the power of God in Him. That is why I am quite sure that we have no business to make any kind of doctrine a test of Church membership, for 'all the fruitness He requireth is to feel your need of Him'. The recognition of His divinity is the result, not the cause, of experiencing His power to save.

"The Churches are full of 'inward'

people who have felt the fascination of such Christian ideas as the infinite worth of every human being, but have not found Christ, and, because they have not found Christ, there is no power but that of their own good intentions behind their busy service. The result is that modern Church life consists too often in the giving of or listening to a constant stream of vague exhortations, in a succession of efforts to galvanize our people into a display of energy by appeals to be up and doing; what we are to do is not clear. We are good people - indeed, we are Christians in so far as we are not Buddhists or Moslems - but we are more Christian in opinion than in fact.

"In these days it is, of course, impossible for thoughtful people to ignore the condition of the world. All the same, it would be a good thing if for twelve months at least we could confine ourselves to the business of making sure that the few people who still come to our services have really found Christ. [Why not devise a practical method of finding him? Ed.] What could be more absurd than an unending series of lectures and addresses on 'Christ and Chaos' or 'The Challenge of the Age to the Church', when speakers and listeners alike are only too well aware that nothing which our diminished company can by any conceivable possibility make any difference to the great world! To such a pass our

humanism has brought us. United preachers and people have received the Kingdom of God, have passed
114 from death into life, from bitterness and apathy to triumphant energy, we have no business to go on to the next item on the agenda. All our crusades, for world evangelism, would peace, for temperance and social reform, presuppose a Church in living and conscious communion with Christ. Before we set about our next effort, ought we not to make sure that we really are members of the body of Christ?

Of one thing we may be sure indeed; it is that, ineffectual as we and the people to whom we preach

are, we are on the way to the discovery of the root of power, if we are really getting desperate. They and we are being guided along the path which leads, by the shortest way possible to well-meaning people like ourselves, to the point of complete disillusionment and final victory. The story of the disciples' frustrated companionship with Jesus has been told us in such detail in order that we may learn to interpret our experience, not primarily as something that is happening to us, but as something that is being done with us. Our mistake all the way through has been that we have interpreted religion as the story of man's search after God, instead of

the story of God's dealing with
man. As long as we sit and read our
Gospels and try to understand, till
come to church, we can be sure that
the very futility of which we are
so conscious is part of the way to
Pentecost. The publicans and
sinners, the lame and the blind,
who came to Jesus were desperate
about themselves; our trouble is
that we are not desperate enough
about ourselves, as the Twelve
were not desperate; we shall
become so by and by, as they
were on Good Friday.

"Throughout the New Testament
the word (δύναμις) is never
used of human power or ability.
Whether it refers to the source of

power or its manifestation, it involves an invasion of this world by something not of this world. The other word (ἐξουσία), also often translated 'power' in our versions, means rather 'control', 'sphere of influence', 'authority'. The demons are under the control of Jesus, so His teaching is 'with authority' (Mark i.27); Satan 'has authority' to cast into hell (Luke xii.5); at his arrest 'darkness' (that is, the kingdom of Satan) 'has authority' over Jesus himself (Luke xxii.53). But when Paul speaks of 'principalities and powers' (e.g. in Eph. vi.12; cf. Rom. viii.38) he means supramundane spirits. Whether or not Dr. Dodd is right in translating Mark ix.1, 'until

you see that the Kingdom of God has come with power,' it is at any rate clear that Jesus sees
115 that an outpouring of supernatural power is the outward and visible sign of the advent, whether that advent be past, present, or future of the 'Kingdom of God'. This

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Santayana in his "The Realm of Spirit" (1940) at p. 53, defines Will as "the observable endeavour in things of any sort to develop a specific form and to preserve it". [This deals with Santa. RKS]

p. 61 "Life, when it has aims, is by definition a realm of will, and a point of reference for inputing good and evil; ...

From "Topics" by Walter Lowrey -
Hogue & Gill, Ltd 1940, in an essay
"Concerning Machines

p. 111. "The ultimate defense of machines is this: that knowledge is good, that the invention of machines proceeds from knowledge, and that to check the growth of machinery is to check the growth of knowledge. Most men do not look so far; they take machines for granted, think them necessary to happiness, and vaguely believe that the history of machinery is the history of benevolent scientific research and progressive enlightenment. Serious students know better; they know that, historically, the progress of mechanical invention owes less to the zeal of scientists than to the greed of industrialists and the ambition of warlords, and that machinery has

hitherto wrought more mischief than blessings. The evidence spreads over hundreds of pages of Mumford's memorable book Technics and Civilization. But Mumford also upholds machinery and there are Christian thinkers who have joined him. In varying terms, they speak to the same purpose: 'We know that the part of machinery does not edify; but we look to its future. Aliena non tollit usum. What has been the means to death and slavery will become the means to the Divine State. And finally:

(112) mechanical invention — invention depends on mechanical knowledge, and you dare not oppose the progress of knowledge; for knowledge is good.

"This argument appeals to some-

thing like a first principle, and therefore deserves respect; nevertheless I submit that, as stated, it is not convincing, and that as addressed to our present society, it is even misleading and dangerous. To a society obsessed with metaphysics it might be salutary; to ours, which ignores or despises speculative knowledge, it might well seem a concession to materialism (though such a result was naturally undesired by Christian users of the argument).

I do not hold — I have no right to hold — that machines are indefectible; but I hold that the philosophical defenders of machines must clarify and sharpen their argument before it becomes acceptable. In particular, they must state the principle

that knowledge is good to other fundamental principles.

"(1) Knowledge is good, but there is a hierarchy of knowledge, whose summit is metaphysics. This truth is the foundation of the traditional thought of East and West; the world of today (at least the western world) ignores + disputes it. From the Renaissance onwards men have been concerned less and less with necessary truth, more and more with contingent truths, which under the name of 'facts' are commonly held to be the purest form of truth — and this not by the ignorant only but by those called scientists and philosophers. Thus it is a commonplace of our thought today that ground theories are proved or disproved

(113) by practice; though the latter cannot prove — it can only illustrate — the higher, and the truth of a theory necessarily depends on its accordance with first principles and on its own internal coherence. In our state of intellectual decay (admirably diagnosed by Guénon in his Crise du Monde Moderne) it is dangerous to applaud mechanical ingenuity without first establishing that such ingenuity belongs, after all to a quite modest order of knowledge, considerably below pure mathematics, immeasurably below metaphysics.

"(2) The knowledge from which mechanical inventions proceed is partly speculative, partly practical. It is chiefly as speculative knowledge

that it deserves some intellectual admiration. Thus we may reasonably admire Leonardo da Vinci for the invention of the submarine which he deliberately left at the speculative stage; he even built the machine, and he destroyed its plans lest the invention should be used for evil purposes. Leonardo's knowledge here was that speculative knowledge in a practical manner of which St. Thomas speaks (S.T., I. 14, 16), giving the example of a builder who considers the building of a house, not with the view of doing the work but ad cognoscendum tantum; the knowledge remaining as an immanent activity which perfects the knower.

But the admiration given to inventive knowledge today is given it just in so far as it is practical. And I imagine that a number of modern inventions have little background of speculative knowledge, the inventor having been content to combine practical results of earlier experiment without defining and analysing and considering the universal predicates of the object

(3) Knowledge of truth is indeed good in itself; yet it may be accidentally evil, or evil in its consequences, as when a man uses such knowledge in order to sin.... The say therefore that a man's good does not consist in knowledge of any and every truth, but in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth. Hence there

is even in fault in the knowledge of certain truths, in so far as the appetite is not duly ordered to the knowledge of the sovereign truth, wherein consists sovereign blessedness.' St Thomas (S.T., II-II. 167, 2.

It is better not to know evil and petty things in so far as they hinder us from consideration of better things (for our intellect cannot embrace many things at one time); and again in so far as thoughts of evil things may pervert the will towards evil. But all this has no place in God, who sees all things in one gaze, and whose will cannot be bent towards evil.' St Thomas. (S.T. I, 22, 3, 3.)

(4) Once speculative knowledge passes into the practice, the virtue of prudence I must intervene. There are some kinds of knowledge which prudence forbids to be applied at all. Thus if I devise a new, certain and untraceable method of murder, the speculative ingenuity does me great credit; but I am obviously forbidden to practise the device, since I should be committing murder. or even use it in fiction, since I might encourage others to murder;

(footnote)

I Prudence, of course, in the strictest scholastic sense — the moral virtue which directs all the rest. What is called prudence in common speech is often a vice —

II In the most mechanical inventions there are possibilities of good & of evil use, and prudence bids the inventor consider these possibilities Leonardo's decision is recorded above. Observe that it is not enough that an invention may or might be put to good use; we must also be reasonably sure that it will not be used otherwise, or at least that any misuse of it will be far outweighed by its legitimate use. In this matter we have now much light from history. Thus whereas we may say it was not humanly possible for the inventor of the Monastic clock to conceive the surprising revolution of the

thought and life which was to follow his invention (see Technics & Civilization), the history of machines for the last two centuries may & must be considered by ourselves. If we invent new machines for speed, we may reasonably suppose that they will be used to carry further the present uses and abuses of our present machines. If we invent new engines of explosion, we cannot expect that they will be used for fireworks in the manner of the ancient Chinese — unless, that is, we have first revived a civilization like that of the ancient Chinese.

Prudence concerns both ends and means. Thus if we are

Considering a machine for the making of things, we must first be sure that what is so made is something worth making; but this does not suffice if it appears that the makers + controlers of such a machine will inevitably be working in an inhuman way. And so forth.

To resume: Those who praise mechanical knowledge must supplement their praise with a proper distinction of the degrees and real limitations of knowledge. Those who favour the growth of inventions must show good reason for the belief that the use of such inventions is likely to be governed by prudence.

Quotation from an article "When Ye Pray" by Mrs. Rhys Davids, in the Jan. 1941 issue of the Hibbert Journal, London.
(Sent Phillips, Boston)

--- Mainly in religions, praying is asking, especially when the need for help is urgently felt. --- Has mankind always so sought aid? ---.

"In a chapter of the Second Collection (Second Gospel, so to speak) of the relatively old Pali Canon, Gotama of the Sakyas (later called Buddha) is seen with his closest ~~fellows~~ fellow-workers enjoying a fine moonlight evening, each in turn saying what the holds may yet enchant that beauty. He is appealed to as a judge between these views; he appreciates them collectively, then gives his own view: 'Better akin to me. It is by virtue

struggle to win what may be won by
force, by energy, by striving while
you sit ....."

Yet two points be noted. He does not
reply in terms of any of the formulae
brought to the front in the Buddhism
of South Asia. Indeed, his saying, so
full of interest as revealing, if true, a
very special emphasis of his own, I
have never seen cited by any Buddhist
or writer on Buddhism. Further, his
saying is more fully worded in a
formula, cited at any rate by early
followers in the Canon: 'Do ye struggle
on, saying to yourselves: gladly would I
have my body's flesh dry up if only
I may hold out until I win what
may be won by force, by energy, by
striving'.

"Now here we have the three new outcrops of the change in religion which are spreading over North India. In it we see what was replacing the Vedic hymn-prayer

Quote from "Prolegomena to the Logic which Searches for Truth" - by Sir ~~Almroth~~ Almroth E. Wright - Heinemann, London, 1941.

p. 13. "the term fallacy (and the same may be said of every abstract term which the layman uses) is a word that is definitely ambiguous." - - -

p. 27. [comparing mistakes & fallacies] i.e. a type of deluding mental picture which evokes assentient reflex responses]

"(b) Fallacies, on the contrary, are physiologically seductive - in other words, the operation of making assentient reflex responses to a fallacy is always pleasurable.

"And when we ask ourselves why Nature should have made the mak-

ing of accentuant reflex responses pleasurable, we see that the answer to that question lies in the fact that fallacies are, as we have seen, beliefs; and that beliefs are, as we have seen, reflex responses.

"We have therefore, in order to resolve our problem, merely to ask ourselves why Nature should have made the act of making a reflex response to a stimulus pleasurable.

"To see the answer to that, we must ask ourselves what would have happened if the existing conditions had been reversed, and if the inception of a stimulus had been made the pleasurable, and the response to the stimulus the unpleasurable, element in the reflex.

"Obviously this would have led

to absolute physiological quietism, and to the suppression of those manifold adjustments which the body now makes under the impulsion of changing external and internal conditions.

"In brief it would have involved a complete abrogation of biological evolution. For biological evolution depends on stimuli which are conveyed to the Central Nervous System setting up there a condition of 'nervous distress' which, functioning as an urge, evokes a reflex response which brings with it a sense of well-being.

"Now these counterpart and contrasted conditions of nervous tension and nervous relief are attached

p 28. not only to the ordinary body reflexes which the physiologist studies, but also to those iconokinetic reflexes which are popularly known as 'beliefs'. And further, the organic comfort which is derived from belief attaches indifferently to all beliefs, whether aesthodically warranted or unwarranted.

"In this, we have a master-key which opens a number of locked doors.

"It explains, for example, the fact that a man who has made assentient reflex responses to any belief desires, as Socke has pointed out, to be left ever afterwards in 'the quiet enjoyment of the opinion he is fond of.' [Conventions essay]

"It explains further the fact that a man who has any inordinate 'iconolastic responsiveness' needs to be perpetually on his guard to defend his fortress of 'Man-soul' against seductive 'aesthodically unwarranted beliefs'. [e.g. the R.C. Church ~~of~~ forbidding its communicants to partake in any other kind of religious service.]

"And further, the psycho-physiological conditions explained above enable us to understand the impulsion to persecution which crops up everywhere. That impulse becomes intelligible when we appreciate that it is a question of rendering evil for evil, and paying back the hostile for mal-

wrongly interfering with beliefs which bring pleasure to folk. [illegible] Incidentally this also explains the authors opposition to pacifism. Also it explains the validity of pacifism; in rendering good for evil, so as to make a flanking attack on the evil. Probably also it explains the effectiveness of voluntary, disciplined, non r.v. suffering in creating in the violent opponent another antithodically caused reflex which alters the reflex of his former belief. Of here also Bandouin's law of reversed effort, & the physiological phrase action of gentle on very slight stimuli; Napoleons 2 laws of strategy to strike your opponent when he is weakest & never to fight on ground of his choosing; and the Swiss sociologists idea that reaction to Pareto

reform is always equal to action, so that no direct reform is ever permanent.)

p. 24. --- "We may usefully recall Newman's apophthegm:- 'Certitude is a mental state; certainty, a quality of propositions.'

"We may, perhaps, usefully elaborate that.

"Certainty - we see this best in mathematics - never fluctuates and does not admit of degrees.

"Certitude, assurance, conviction, and belief are all of them (for they are states of mind engendered by 'splanchnokinetic reflexes') subject to fluctuation and admit of degrees.

"And certitude, conviction, and belief, begin to waver as soon as ideas no

longer produce, when recalled to mind, the powerful reflex responses they originally evoked. And conviction grows upon us, and belief waxes stronger, when ideas continue to evoke, every time they are recalled to mind, reflex responses of the same or greater amplitude.

"We may remember how Cromwell's adjuration when driven to despair by the irrationality of a crew of Scottish ministers: - 'I beseech you by the bowels of Christ to believe it possible that you may be mistaken.'" ----

p. 23. --- "Two things in particular contribute to fallacy [an aesthetically unwarranted and therefore presumptively erroneous iconolimitic reflex of belief]. First, a man

(pp 20-21)

must have worked himself up, or must have been worked up by others, into a state of high 'nervous tension'; and secondly, ideas which are born of the imagination require to be held before a man's mind long enough to do effective work upon his viscera.

"I remember a deeply religious man opening his heart to me about this.

"'When I go down upon my knees,' he said, 'it is for a long time a monologue; but it becomes in the end always a dialogue.'

"And the same lesson can be learned from regarding those linear figures (They are to be found in all physiological text books) which

can be interpreted, at one time as convex, and at another, as concave.

"For the act of accomodating or relaxing one's focus upon the particular lines on which the interpreting of these linear figures as convex or concave depends, does not come off until one has, by an act of auto-suggestion which occupies time, managed to convolve the vision one is minded to see."

"Only a country which is able to accept defeat is worthy of victory" — Mary Gamble in Peace News for July 4, 1941.
[Cf Kipling's "If" resp.]

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